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Recent Canadian Human Rights Decisions Having an 
Impact on Gender-Based Risk Classification Systems 
Robert L. Brown* 
Abstract 
With the passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on April 
17, 1982, all previous court precedents using gender in risk classification sys-
tems became obsolete. Three cases involving issues of discrimination in the 
use of age and gender now clarify the position of the Canadian judiciary. Based 
on the decisions in these three cases, this paper presents arguments that can 
be used in any jurisdiction to defend successfully the use of gender in a prop-
erty /casualty risk classification system. 
Key words and phrases: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, human 
rights, gender discrimination, risk selection, automobile insurance, mandatory 
retirement 
1 Introduction 
The existence of the new Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(April 17, 1982) brings challenges to many of the present risk classifica-
tion parameters used by the Canadian automobile insurance industry,l 
Individual insurance contracts are generally subject to the sections of 
*Robert L. Brown, F.C.r.A., F.S.A., A.C.A.S., is professor of statistics and actuarial sci-
ence and director of the Institute of Insurance and Pension Research at the University 
of Waterloo. He is a past president of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries and is cur-
rently on the SOCiety of Actuaries' Board of Governors and Executive Committee. He 
was an elected Councillor in the City of Waterloo from 1988 to 1994. Professor Brown 
has authored several articles and books. 
Professor Brown's address is: Department of Statistics and Actuarial Sci-
ence, University of Waterloo, Waterloo ON N2l 3G1, Canada. Internet address: 
rlbrown@jeeves.uwaterloo.ca 
I See Brown (1988) for a discussion of some of the actuarial implications of the 
Charter. 
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provincial human rights codes prohibiting certain types of discrimina-
tion. These codes often provide special provisions for insurance. For 
example, the Ontario Human Rights code provides for limited exemp-
tions for insurance "on reasonable and bona fide grounds because of 
age, sex, marital status, family status, or handicap," What is reasonable 
and bona fide has become the issue. 
This paper reviews three recent court cases in Canada that have 
made the application of these human rights provisions much clearer 
for insurance risk classification systems. While the cases are Canadian, 
the reasoning and logic used by the courts are universal. 2 
2 Dickason v. University of Alberta 
At issue in this case is the fact that the University of Alberta has 
an age 65 mandatory retirement clause that had forced Professor Olive 
Dickason to retire. The Individual's Rights Protection Act of Alberta 
(Revised Statute of Alberta (RSA) 1980) prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of age but includes the phrase: "except where reasonable and 
justifiable in the circumstances". 
A board of inquiry appointed to hear the appellant's complaint de-
cided in her favor and ordered that she be reinstated. The Court of 
Queen's Bench (Alberta), upon appeal from the university, upheld the 
decision of the board of inquiry. Upon further appeal, however, the 
Alberta Court of Appeal overturned the lower court decision. Finally, 
the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Supreme Court of Canada (September 24, 1992), on a 4-3 vote, 
supported the Court of Appeal of Alberta and found in favor of the 
University of Alberta. In writing the majority opinion, Justice]. Cory 
stated: 
The University has shown that the impugned practice of man-
datory retirement is reasonable and justifiable within the 
meaning of section 11.1 of the Individual's Rights Protection 
Act. 
In the construction of human rights legislation, the rights 
enunciated must be given their full recognition and effect, 
while defenses to the exercises of those rights should be 
interpreted narrowly. 
2Copies of all of the cases and court opinions discussed in this paper are available 
from the Insurance Bureau of Canada (IBC), 181 University Avenue, Toronto ON M5H 
3M?, Canada. 
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The nurturing of academic freedom and the ensuring of fac-
ulty renewal are most delicate matters that do not lend them-
selves to a single clear-cut answer as to the proportionality 
between the burden of the discrimination complained of and 
the objectives sought . 
. . . the terms of the collective agreement relating to compul-
sory retirement will apply to every member of the faculty 
association. Moreover, the union did not negotiate the term 
in a vacuum, but rather in the context of a system of tenure 
which protects all members of faculty from dismissal with-
out just cause, and provides a pension scheme assuring the 
financial security of all retiring members of faculty. 
The objectives of mandatory retirement were stated to be the 
preservation of tenure, the promotion of academic renewal, 
the facilitation of planning and resource management, and 
the protection of "retirement with dignity" for faculty mem-
bers. 
(These objectives) are of sufficient significance to justify the 
limitation of a constitutional right to equality. The impugned 
retirement practice is rationally connected to the objectives 
cited. The retirement of faculty members at the age of 65 
ensures that the university may readily predict the rate at 
which employees will leave the institution and that positions 
are opened for new faculty. Mandatory retirement also al-
lows the university to renew its faculty by means of remedy-
ing the twofold problem of limited funding and a "bulge" in 
the age distribution of professors. As well, the policy sup-
ports the existence of a tenure system which creates barriers 
to the dismissal of faculty members thereby enhancing aca-
demic independence. In the university setting, mandatory 
retirement also withstands the minimal impairment test. No 
obvious alternative policy exists which would achieve the 
same results without restricting the individual rights of fac-
ulty members. Finally, the effects of the prima facie discrim-
ination are proportional to the legitimate objectives served. 
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While the Dickason case does not deal with property/casualty in-
surance matters, it is the first of a series of important human rights 
cases. Hence, an understanding of the two other cases, which impact 
auto insurance risk classification systems directly, is enhanced by this 
summary of the Dickason decision. 
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3 Zurich Insurance Company v. Ontario (Human 
Rights Commission) and Bates 
A young male driver, Michael Bates, complained to the Ontario Hu-
man Rights Commission in 1983 that he was paying higher rates for his 
auto insurance because of his gender. The Human Rights Commission 
appointed a board of inquiry that concluded that the driver classifica-
tion for unmarried male drivers contravened the Human Rights Code. 
Zurich Insurance appealed this decision, and the Divisional Court al-
lowed the appeal (Le., found in favor of Zurich). This judgment was 
appealed by the Human Rights Commission and Bates to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal. The case finally went 
to the Supreme Court of Canada which found in favor of the Zurich 
Insurance Company (5-2). 
Justice John Sopinka, writing for the majority on the Supreme Court, 
stated that the issue to be determined in the appeal is whether the 
method by which Zurich set its rates, which admittedly discriminates 
on the basis of age, sex, and marital status, nonetheless satisfies the 
reasonable and bona fide grounds exemption provided by section 21 
of the Ontario Code. Noting that the board of inquiry had determined 
that the section 21 exemption has the same meaning as the bona fide 
occupational qualification or requirement when applied in employment 
cases, the court decided that while individual testing is often feasible 
in the case of an employee, individualized assessment is not possible 
in the case of insurance. That is, the court agreed that some form of 
grouping is an essential element of the insuring process. 
The court also noted that single males under the age of 25 have 
the highest claim frequency, the highest loss per car insured, and the 
highest average claim cost of any of the categories for which statistics 
are kept. The insurer's rate classification system (as even the board of 
inquiry had conceded) is based on credible actuarial statistics, is sound 
and accepted business practice, and therefore is reasonable. The court, 
however, stated that the statistical application would not be considered 
reasonable if there were an alternative which in all the circumstances 
was practicable. The board of inquiry had decided that Zurich had not 
proved that the very essence of its business would be undermined if 
it no longer could use its rate classification system using age, sex, and 
marital status. The Supreme Court believed that this decision sets a 
standard higher than that required by section 21 of the Human Rights 
Code and that the board of inquiry had given insufficient weight to the 
difficulties inherent in attempting to adopt new criteria in the absence 
Brown: Canadian Human Rights Decisions 175 
of an adequate statistical base. 
Although it could be that an alternative statistical base might exist 
in 1992 (the time of the Supreme Court decision), the Supreme Court 
had to judge the situation as it existed in 1983. The Supreme Court 
said that the insurance industry must be allowed time to determine 
whether it could restructure its classification system in a manner that 
would eliminate discrimination based on enumerated group character-
istics and still reflect the disparate risks of different classes of drivers 
and concluded that it would be inappropriate for the court to find a 
particular practice to be unreasonable when no reasonable alternative 
existed. 
4 Watters (Alberta Human Rights Commission) v. 
Co-operators General Insurance Company 
This case again involves a young male driver who claimed discrimi-
nation based on the grounds that auto insurance rates used gender as 
a rating factor for persons under age 25. As this case was in Alberta, 
the act that defines prohibited discrimination is again the Individual's 
Rights Protection Act (RSA 1980) previously seen in the Dickason case. 
Using the wording of section 11.1 of the act, the Co-operators Gen-
eral Insurance Company stated that the practice of using gender as a 
risk classification parameter is reasonable and justifiable in the circum-
stances. 
In a decision dated February 22,1990, the Alberta board of inquiry 
found: 
... that the complaint of the complainant under section 3(b) 
of the Individual's Rights Protection Act is justified and that 
the respondent has failed to establish under section 11.1 of 
the act that the contravention is reasonable and justifiable 
in the circumstances. 
The board ordered Co-operators to cease the contravention com-
plained of and to refrain in the future from committing the same or sim-
ilar contraventions. The board's decision was appealed by Co-operators 
to the Court of Queen's Bench which dismissed the appeal (Le., Co-
operators lost again). 
Co-operators appealed to the Court of Appeal of Alberta. The find-
ings of the Court of Appeal of Alberta, dated November 9, 1993, were 
in favor of Co-operators. Watters (and the Alberta Human Rights Com-
mission) appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. On June 2, 1994, 
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the Supreme Court of Canada stated that it would not hear this case, 
which means that the decision of the Court of Appeal of Alberta (in 
favor of Co-operators) stands. This normally implies that the Supreme 
Court could not find fault with the lower court decision, but that is not 
stated explicitly. It is worthwhile analyzing the decision of the Court of 
Appeal of Alberta. 
In summary, the Court of Appeal found that the gender-based clas-
sification system used by Co-operators in setting rates constituted dis-
crimination, but that the practice is excused as being reasonable and 
justifiable in the circumstances (section 11.1). In deciding that the 
gender-based classification system was discriminatory, the court stated 
that: 
... if a discrimination prohibited by law exists it is no less 
prohibited discrimination because it is supported by statis-
tics. 
Thus, the existence of actuarial data to support distinguishing two risk 
classes, using demographic parameters, does not, by itself, counter the 
charge of discrimination. 
The court, having decided that the action of Co-operators was dis-
criminatory, as laid out in section 3(b) of the act, then proceeded to 
section 11.1 to determine if the practice was excused by being reason-
able and justifiable in the circumstances. 
The Court of Appeal referred to the precedents set by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in both the Dickason and the Bates cases for what is 
reasonable and justified. The judgment refers to guidelines established 
in the Dickason case: 
That familiar test directs the party raising a s. 13 defense to 
demonstrate; (i) that the restriction of a right is undertaken 
in the pursuit of a pressing and substantial objective and (ii) 
that the impugned restrictive measure is proportional to the 
enacted measure as evidenced by the fact that it is (a) ratio-
nally connected, (b) constitutes a minimal impairment to the 
right and (c) is proportional in its effects. In its application, 
the Court has adopted a flexible standard of proof which re-
sponds to the varying contexts in which the state seeks to 
invoke s. 1 justification for the impugned legislation. 
3Author's note: The "s. 1" referred to here is section 1 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, which is the guideline used to determine if any government 
legislation is discriminatory. 
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The Alberta Court of Appeal agreed with certain statements of the 
Supreme Court in the Bates, in particular: 
... in the insurance industry it is impractical in the extreme 
to individually assess the risk that each person brings to the 
system and that therefore grouping into risk classifications 
is necessary. It follows that this factor distinguishes it from 
most other human rights cases which call for an individual 
to be dealt with on his or her own merits. 
The Court of Appeal also felt bound to take into account the Supreme 
Court's concept of reasonableness, defined in the Bates case: 
In my opinion, a discriminatory practice is reasonable within 
the meaning of s. 21 of the Code if (a) it is based on a sound 
and accepted insurance practice; and (b) there is no prac-
tical alternative. Under (a), a practice is sound if it is one 
which it is desirable to adopt for the purpose of achieving 
the legitimate business objective of charging premiums that 
are commensurate with risk. Under (b), the availability of a 
practical alternative is a question of fact to be determined 
having regard to all of the facts of the case. 
Watters (and the Human Rights Commission of Alberta) did not ob-
ject to risk classification per se. They also accepted that gender is a 
sound actuarial rating variable correlated with loss. They did argue, 
however, that gender-based auto insurance rating was not minimally in-
trusive because reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives to the prac-
tice existed. In that matter the court directed that any practical alter-
native must meet three objectives: it must lead to a financially viable 
insurance industry; it must result in wide availability of insurance; and 
it must be fair, but it need not replicate the results of the impugned 
practice. 
The court decided that a financially viable insurance industry and 
wide availability of insurance would exist even if gender were prohibited 
as a rating factor. The annual mileage driven is a rating variable that 
could offset, to some extent, the loss of gender as a rating variable. The 
court also noted that genderless systems exist in Michigan, Montana, 
and Pennsylvania where insurance is still widely available. 
The Court of Appeal decided that fairness must take into account 
the interests of all significantly affected parties, not just young males. 
In that regard, the court noted the following statistics: 
• In Alberta if gender were removed as a rating variable, rates for 
young female drivers were expected to rise between 24 percent 
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and 29 percent and rates for young male drivers were expected to 
fall between 15 percent and 17 percent. 
• A British Columbia study revealed that 40 percent to 50 percent 
of crashes resulting in death that were not due to alcohol (about 
1/2 of all crashes overall) involved young male drivers. 
• Young men also account for approximately 40 percent of all road 
accidents resulting in death or injury. 
• Young men are seriously overrepresented in traffic crashes of any 
severity compared to females. 
• Studies have established that young male drivers pose a greater 
risk of loss and are the most at risk in the system, more so than 
more experienced drivers (be they male or female). 
Further, the court stated that: 
It is clear from the evidence that alternatives to the cur-
rent gender-based classification system would result in sig-
nificant unfairness to young females in that they would be 
asked to pay rates disproportionate to their driving record. 
Specifically, the evidence demonstrates that the insurance 
premiums of young female drivers would rise by between 
24 percent and 29 percent if the gender rating classification 
were eliminated. This is a significant increase which would 
impose an unwarranted financial impact on that group. It 
cquld even prevent members of that group from enjoying 
the privilege of driving. The fact that young females would 
pay the same rate as young males, despite their far superior 
driving record, (both as to number and seriousness of acci-
dents) would not in my view, fairly reflect the disparate risks 
of different classes of drivers. 
The next significant group one must consider is young males. 
I conclude that the gender-based rating classification is not 
unfair to that group as the rates charged to them would be 
an attempt to fairly reflect the number and severity of acci-
dents involving young males. 
The decision also notes the impact on drivers over the age of 25 and 
concludes that it is not unfair to older male and female drivers to pay 
rates based on factors other than gender because gender is relatively 
less important after the age of 25. 
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The court concludes: 
Looked at from the perspective of equity, it is inequitable to 
give a significantly higher risk group-young males-an unde-
served break by, in effect, transferring the burden of their 
driving record to other lower risk groups. 
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The Court of Appeal therefore found that Co-operators had demon-
strated that the discriminatory practice was reasonable and justified in 
the circumstances and ruled in their favor. 
5 Conclusion 
Canadian actuaries now have a clear indication of how a gender-
based risk classification system will be adjudicated by the courts in a 
post-Charter environment. While these cases are based on Canadian 
case law, the arguments should be universally applicable. 
In this regard, and given the author's personal experience in the 
Watters case, I now offer what I believe is a sound defense of a gender-
based risk classification system for automobile insurance. 
First, insurance companies do not manufacture insurance policies 
and then price them for retail sale. The insurance industry is not a part 
of the manufacturing sector. Rather, it is part of the service sector. 
The service that an insurance company offers is one of facilitation of 
a age-old process called risk sharing or risk pooling. For a set premium, 
the insurance company allows a policyholder to share his or her eco-
nomic risk (Le., variance from a expected value) with a large number of 
other independent policyholders. This risk-pooling concept was avail-
able before insurance companies through community risk sharing and 
through fraternals and other non-insurance associations. The premium 
that a policyholder pays the insurance company is commensurate with 
the expected value of the cost that the policyholder brings to the risk 
pool. 
Thus, the insurance process, once clearly understood, is not discrim-
inatory. Service is provided equally regardless of the policyholder's age, 
gender, religion, and race. The cost of insurance is the expected cost the 
policyholder brings to the risk pool-nothing more and nothing less. 
A useful analogy would be a restaurant that allows any customer to 
eat in the establishment regardless of age, gender, etc., but that charges 
a different price for Souvlaki than it does for Tandoori chicken, and a 
lower price for children's meals. This is not a discriminatory practice 
as defined in the human rights legislation. 
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Using the arguments outlined so succinctly in the Watters case, one 
can argue successfully that the manner in which rates are set (Le., using 
gender-based risk classifications) is reasonable and justifiable in the 
circumstances. No superior alternative exists, either in fact or in theory. 
I hope that the summary review of these three important cases will 
assist in future cases where gender-based risk classification systems 
are brought into question. 
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